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To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Utah: 
The Respondents present this petition for a rehearing 
of the above cause and, in support thereof, respectfully shew: 
1. The appeal in the cause was argued before this 
Court on May 9th, 1978. 
2. On July 13, 1978, this Court rendered its decision 
in favor of the Appellants and against the Respondents reversing 
the judgment of the District Court in part. 
3. Respondents seek a rehearing upon the following 
grounds: 
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a. THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL DENIED RESPONDENTS DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW IN THAT: 
"Issues" and "facts" beyond those properly before 
the trial court and improper and untrue were accepted by the 
opinion without opportunity for hearing, presentation of 
evidence or cross examination of witnesses or "extraneous 
circumstances" of "legislative history and intent." 
b. THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL IS UNSUPPORTED AND INACCURATE 
IN THAT 
It inaccurately characterizes rules of interpretatioo 
employed in Federal-State separation of power models and makes 
unsupported conclusions about substantive allocations of power 
in those models. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this 
petition be granted. 
Dated: August 1, 1978 
/ 
/(/ ,/: -. ,/ 
' c:: Counsel 
/ ' 
/
' / i 
,,-v ~I 
for Respondent' 
I hereby certify that the foregoing~tition is submitted in 
good faith and not for purpo'e' ofely. , (f\ ~µ_. ' ~ ~ ·o/., 94.L--'' 
//((_ //:~, 
Counsel for Respondent·, 
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NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION 
This is a Petition for Rehearing on this Court's 
decision filed on the 13th day of July, 1978 as written by 
Mr. Justice Hall. The scope of the requested rehearing is 
limited to that portion of the decision which reverses the 
trial court's Summary Declaratory Judgment involving the 
interpretation and application of statutes related to the 
Council-Mayor Optional Form of Municipal Government. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Pursuant to their Petition, the petitioners seek 
the following relief: 
First, that the Court issue a new opinion sustain-
ing the trial courts Declaratory Summary Judgment in its 
entirety in accord with dissent of Justice Crockett or 
failing that; 
Second, remand the case to the trial court on a 
finding of ambiguity or doubtfulness of the statutes with 
instructions to receive proper evidence of "extraneous 
circumstances" to aid in the interpretation of the statutes. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The substantive "facts" as they relate to this 
petition for rehearing (on Point II) were as they are 
established in the record of the trial court in the transcM; 
verified and unverified pleadings, affidavits, and documents 
and no new statement thereof is material to this petition ~ 
re'.1earing. 
The p_£ocedural "facts" that relate to Point I are 
that :'."'ie trial court interpreted and applied the Council-!·12 
Optio~al Form of Municipal Government Act on the basis of 
ori:-;iar~· rules of construction, and was not urged by any part 
nor did it determine that the act was ambiguous or of doubt!'. 
mea~i~g or application to the issues before the court. It 
was c~ this basis that Appellants lodged their appeal. No 
par:y ,including amicus curiae) has asked for nor has this 
Court determined that the Act was ambiguous or of doubtful 
meaning or application to this case. 
The following matters bearing on interpretation we: 
interposed on appeal for the first time in an unsworn petiti: 
and trief signed by Melvin Leslie, Steven W. Allred and 
Jerrald D. Conder, as legal counsel "representing" three 
legislators, amicus curiae. Those "new" matters were their 
subjective understanding of legislative intent; claimed 
linkages between intent in the repealed Strong-Mayor Act 
and the Act in question and general "legislative history." 
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This appearance of Amicus Curiae was objected 
to on motion before the Supreme Court to allowing their 
appearances on the grounds that it attempted to introduce 
"new facts'' and the Chief Justice stated that their 
appearance could not introduce "new facts." 
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BRIEF 
POINT I 
2. THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL DENIED RESPONDENTS PROCEDU~ 
DUE PROCESS IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT. 
The opinion of Justice Hall erred by invading the 
province of the trial court and resorted for the first ti~ 
on appeal to "extrinsic circumstances" to interpret a 
legislative enactment without first determining an ambigui~ 
existed. All the parties submitted this matter to the trial 
court for "Summary Judgment" on the basis that the court 
could determine the interpret a ti on of the law wi thont resort 
to extrinsic facts and the trial court so ruled. 
No party at the S:..imrH:"'J' J:..idgment level alleged or 
attempted to introduce testimony that the statutes were 
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning as applied to the issues 
presented. 
There is no pleading, document, affidavit that was 
before the trial court or anything other than the unsworn 
briefs before the Supreme Court alleging or claiming in any 
way that the Council-Mayor Optional Form of Government Act 
was either ambiguous or of doubtful meaning or any other 
similar claim as those laws applied to the issues before t~ 
trial court. The trial court made no such finding of 
ambiguity or doubtful meaning either expressly or impliedly, 
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and the trial court then properly ruled in Summary Judgment 
on the issues based on the primary rule that statutes are 
interpreted according to the legislative intent as expressed 
in the law, as interpreted in accordance with well accepted 
cannons of statutory construction. 
The trial court would have erred had it in fact 
inquired into "extrinsic circumstances" unless, first, some 
party had claimed the applicable statutes ambiguous or of 
doubtful meaning or application and, second, the trial court 
had found affirmatively that they were ambiguous or of 
doubtful meaning. Neither condition was met. 
Any inquiry beyond the expressions of the act and 
into "extraneous circumstances" are to be prefaced by the 
strong caveat of a finding of "ambiguity or doubtfulness." 
The meaning to be ascribed to a statute can 
only be derived from a considered weighing 
of every relevant aid to construction. In 
some cases, the true meaning of an ambiguous 
statute may be found from extraneous 
circumstances. For this purpose, it has 
been regarded as proper for courts to resort 
to, or take judicial notice of, facts or 
events, of common knowledge reasonably 
within the scope of judicial cognizance. 
However, conjectures aliunde are not sufficient 
for this purpose. It is clearly improper to 
resort to extrinsic circumstances where the 
statute is plain and unambiguous. 
73 Am Jur 2nd Statutes §147. 
A federal case in the Fourth Circuit succinctly 
pinpoints the gross fallacy of the opinion of Justice Hall 
as it wanders aimlessly into forbidden and erroneous 
"extraneous circumstances." 
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When the meaning of a law is evident, to go 
elsewhere in search of conjecture in order 
to ~estrict or extend the act would be an 
att~mpt to elude it, a method which, if 
once admitted, would be exceedingly danger-
ous, since there would be no law, however 
definite and precise in its language, which 
might not by interpretation be rendered 
useless. 
Re Boggs-Rice Co. (CA4) 66 F2d 855. 
The citations in the Memorandum of Amicus Curiae 
in support of Petition to Intervene clearly establish this 
same principle. Thus in Utah this Court has determined that 
a condition precedent to delving into "history" and "purpose' 
is a finding first that the legislation's interpretation is 
doubtful or uncertain. 
The Petition of Amicus Curiae to Intervene clearly 
establishes a critical point that would otherwise require M 
examination of the record in the trial court to discover. 
Their avowed purpose in intervenirg was 
5. That the legislative intent and history 
of aforesaid legislation have not been 
fully presented to the lower Court and 
such information may be of assistance in 
this Court's deliberations. 
Petition at p. 2. 
This statement correctly reflects the status of 
the record. No one claimed "ambiguity" or "doubtfulness" 
and the tri~l court properly relied on the primary rule of 
interpreting the act and its intent from its wording and t~ 
necessary implications of that wording. Counsel for the 
Amicus Curiae (who should of all be most familiar with rules 
of statutory interpretation) implies that the trial court 
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should have wandered into those clearly forbidden paths by 
inquiring into "history" and the "subjective intent of three 
legislators." 
The offense to justice was further compounded when 
Respondents specifically objected orally before this court to 
Amicus Curiae appearing for the purposes stated in their 
petition and were assured by Mr. Chief Justice Ellett in 
that hearing that the Court was sufficiently perceptive to 
disregard such matters and would only consider legal arguments 
based upon facts in the trial court record. 
But contrary to the rule of law, procedural due 
process and the express assurances of this Court, the opinion 
of Justice Hall adopts facts and rests its conclusion on 
those improper "extraneous circumstances" and "historical 
conjectures" introduced in the briefs of Amicus Curiae and 
Appellant. 
Citations from the Opinion: 
Three state legislators also appear as amici 
curiae for the avowed purpose of informing 
the Court as to the legislative intent in 
enacting the Act. 
Opinion of Justice Hall at p. 2. 
In order to place the issues pr~sented by 
this appeal in proper perspective it is 
helpful to trace the structural development 
of municipal government in Utah. 
Opinion of Justice Hall at p. 2. 
It was from that legislation (Strong Mayor Act) 
that the initial legislative intent clearly 
emerged to provide an optional form of 
municipal government framed in the image of 
the federal and state systems. 
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In 1975 the Legislature repealed the Strong 
Mayor Form of Government Act and enacted 
substantially similar provisions in the Act 
upon which this appeal focuses. The legisla-
tive intent remained clear to provide 
variations in the traditional forms of 
government consistent with present day needs 
as is evidenced by the following observation 
inserted as a preface to the Act: 
Opinion of Justice Hall, at p. 2. 
We are of the opinion that the trial judge 
placed undue emphasis on that portion of the 
Act which declared the Council to be the 
"governing body." His disinclination to 
construe all of the provisions of the Act in 
the light of the definition of that term, as 
set forth in the Act, caused him to draw 
erroneous conclusions and thus misinterpret 
the law. 
When the Act is read in its entirety, and ea~ 
provision thereof is read in context with all 
of the others and when viewed in the light of 
the legislative history of municipal governrne~ 
in Utah, we are compelled to conclude that it 
in fact provides for the absolute separation of 
executive and legislative powers. A fortiori, 
the 1977 modifications to the Act specifically 
vest the whole of the executive powers in the 
Mayor and only the legislative powers in the 
Council, and we consequently hold that the 
council-mayor form of government as adopted by 
Logan City is a true separation of powers form 
of government. 
Opinion of Justice Hall, at p. 6. 
The opinion of Justice Hall on its face is a clear 
acknowledgment that it "viewed in the light of the legislativ 
history (introduced by conjecture), of municipal government 
in Utah" and but for that it would have sustained the trial 
court's decision which was based on the interpretation of the 
"four corners of the law." 
Even had the above cited conjecture been a correct 
statement of historical fact, the injury to procedural due 
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process would have been substantial for the procedure 
employed denies Respondents their right to present evidence, 
cross-examine witnesses and have review on appeal limited 
to factual issues tried in the lower court. 
But here there is a more substantive injury; 
those same "legally irrelevant historical facts and 
conjectures" are in fact historically wrong as evidenced by 
the attached affidavits of the Honorable Senator Bullen and 
the Honorable Representative Gardner. 
The explicit conjecture that the divisions provided 
in the repealed strong-mayor form of government were "intended" 
to be "substantially similar" to those provided in the Council 
Mayor form is disputed in the sworn affidavit of Senator 
Bullen. Such a conjecture is unfounded in light of the true 
history. The true course of events could only lead one to the 
exact opposite conclusion. The facts as revealed by the 
Bullen affidavit are: 
1. Rejection by a majority of Logan City electorate 
in 1973 in a referendum of the Strong Mayor Form of 
Government. 
2. Repeal by the Legislature primarily because of 
the Logan electorate's rejection of the substance of that 
Strong Mayor Act. 
3. Adoption of Council-Mayor Form by the 1975 
Legislature to overcome the substantive objections of Logan's 
electorate to the repealed Strong-Mayor Form. 
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4. The subsequent acceptance by majority of Logan': 
electorate of the Council-Mayor Form in a referendum. 
The correct and true history does not support the 
opinion of Justice Hall that there was no substantive dif~~ 
between the two acts. A comparison of the power vesting 
and definition provisions of the repealed Strong-Mayor forn 
and the Council-Mayor Form also belie the conclusions in the 
opinion of Justice Hall. 
Also attached hereto is an affidavit of one of the 
so-called amicus curiae which exemplifies the result of a 
denial of due process. The Honorable Representative Willard 
Hale Gardner one of the three (legislator) witnesses who 
according to the opinion of Justice Hall concurred in 
"declaring legislative intent," but in fact, who never filed 
so much as an affidavit or even a bare signed statement as tc 
what his intent was, counters and re,j ects the reading of 
legislative intent presented in the Brief bearing his name 
and relied upon by the Court. Mr. Gardner claims that it 
was his understanding and that of the legislature that the 
Council would have the powers attributed by the Court to t~ 
Mayor as they pertained to buying and selling real property 
and approving subdivisions and zoning in general. The re suit 
of a denial Of due process is to have that man's views 
represented to this court without so much as his knowledge 
that he or his name is being used therefore. It becomes 
clear why due process requires a hearing, confrontation of 
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witnesses, opportunity for cross-examination, etc., in the 
introduction of evidence. The opinion of Justice Hall in 
accepting this evidence indicates the result of a palpable 
denial of due process. Evidence which is not evidence and 
which does not exist has found its way into the opinion of 
Justice Hall. By this precipitous meandering into "extraneous 
circumstances" on appeal under the guise of some spurious 
notion of judicial notice, Respondents have been denied due 
process. 
Respondents are continuing to examine other legislators 
and walk that endless and costly path of dubious legality 
in search of evidence pursuant to "secondary rules of 
construction." Respondents now have substantial reason to 
believe that the opinion of Mr. Justice Hall with regard to 
legislative intent and its conclusions is not in harmony 
with the views of the other two legislator witnesses as 
those views would be expressed in cross examination in a 
trial court. Respondents know that innumerable legislator-
witnesses could be called who would repudiate the conclusions. 
This is a clear case of judicial legislation, 
accomplished at the expense of Respondent's due process 
guarantees, in violation of the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Of course the whole bailiwick ought to be off 
limits until ambiguity is affirmatively found. It is clear 
that any principle allowing consideration of the above cited 
.. 
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conjectures by legislators or about legislation is dependent 
on the Court's initial determination that the statute is 
doubtful or ambiguous. American Jurisprudence Second discus: 
the general rules respecting "extraneous circumstances" 
finding that it is only appropriate for the "interpretation 
of ambiguous language," "where the meaning of the words used 
is doubtful, etc. Statutes §§ 148, 150. 
Moreover, the legislative history of a 
statute may not comDel a construction 
at variance with its plain words, and 
where the language of a statute is un-
ambiguous, consideration of the history 
of the legislation is not permissible. 
Although it has been declared that the 
legislative history of an act becomes 
imoortant only in extremely doubtful matters 
of interpretation. 
Statutes §151 (Footnotes omitted - emphasis added). 
As to the evidence which may be used of these 
"extraneous circumstances" there are significant restrictions 
The opinions of individual legislators, or the 
testimony of a member of the legislature as to the 
intention of the legislature in enacting a 
statute, may not be given consideration. 
Statutes § 169 (Footnotes omitted). 
Apart from ooinions expressed in debates, the 
actual proceedings of the legislature, or the 
steps taken in the enactment of a law, or the 
history of the passage of the law through the 
legislature, may be resorted to as an a~d in the 
interpretation of a statute. However, there is 
contrary authority; moreover, it has been said 
that only in extremely doubtful matters of 
interpretation does the legislative history of 
an act of Congress become important. Of course, 
there may be no resort to the le~islative h1sto~ 
of the enactment of a statute, the lan~uage of 
which is plain and unambiguous, since such 
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legislative history may only be resorted 
to for the purpose of solving doubt, not for 
the purpose of.creating it. By the same token, 
it has been said that when statutory language 
is explicit, legislative history simply 
corroborates the obvious meaning of the 
language used in the law 
It is well settled that to ascertain legislative 
intent in enacting a statute the language of 
which is of doubtful or ambiguous imnort, 
resort may be had to the journals or other 
legislative records showing the history in 
the legislature of the act in question while it 
was in process of enactment. 
Statute §170 (footnotes omitted). 
It is noted here that the opinion of Justice Hall resorts to 
legislative history without finding any ambiguity in the 
statues and further has relied on improper evidence. Respondents 
note too that the doubt was created in the first place by 
resort to improper evidence at the appellate court level. 
The procedure used can be likened to an appeal 
dealing with the application of the parol evidence rule where 
the trial court rules on the meaning of a contract and its 
application based upon a submission of the parties. The trial 
court reads the contract, gives it a proper "four corners 
interpretation," there being no claim of uncertainty or 
ambiguity and properly no resort by the trial court to 
extrinsic parol evidence. The losing party then appeals and 
the appellate court at the suggestion of amicus curiae takes 
"judicial notice" of hotly contested and highly questionable 
"parol" or "extrinsic evidence" inadmissible in the trial 
court and presented in an unsworn brief to interpret the 
contract and overrule the trial court's "four corners" 
interpretation. This occurs on the appellate level without a 
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suggestion of ambiguity or uncertainty or doubtfulness as 
to the meaning of the contract. There is no hearing, no 
right to cross examine or confront witnesses, etc. Add to 
that mixture two sworn affidavits indicating the appellate 
court is wrong about the parol facts. 
The opinion of the Court clearly denied Respondent': 
constitutional rights and violated accepted procedures as 
follows: 
1. Rule 12-(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
A judge or a reviewing court taking 
judicial notice under paragraph (1) 
or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore 
so noticed in the action shall afford the 
parties reasonable opportunity to present 
information relevant to the propriety of 
taking such judicial notice and to the tenor 
of the matter to be noticed. 
2. Article I, Section 7 of Constitution of the 
State of Utah and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States in the following particulars: 
(a) The right to have the appeal determined on the. 
evidence and issues before the trial court and not arbi-
trarily: 
Due process of law protects against arbitrary 
action, consequently, arbitrary action by the 
tribunal in the hearing of a cause or in its 
order violates due process. 
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §576 (Footnotes omitted). 
(b) The right to fundamental fairness in the use 
of evidence. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids fundamental unfairness in the use 
of evidence, whether true or false. It is an 
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immutable principle of jurisprudence that 
where governmental action seriously injures 
an individual and the reasonableness of the 
action depends on fact findings, the evidence 
used to prove the government's case, docu-
mentary evidence and, even more important, 
testimony, must be disclosed to the individual 
so that he has the op~ortunity to show that it 
is untrue. Due process implies the right to 
contradict by proof every material fact which 
bears on the question of right involved. 
Moreover, the case against the party asserting 
the protection of the due process guaranty must 
be made out by proof, in the absence of a 
default. 
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §578 (Footnotes omitted). 
(c) The opportunity for hearing and cross examination 
relative to "extraneous circumstances 11 or "legislative 
history. 11 
An opportunity for hearing is one of the essential 
elements of due process. 
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §569 (Footnotes omitted). 
(d) The right to raise issues and set up defenses 
to "legislative history and subjective intent": 
Due process requires that a party sought to be 
affected by a proceeding shall have the right 
to raise such issues or set up any defense which 
he may have in the cause. Even if he has no 
defense to the action, the fundamental law of 
the land secures to him the right to be heard in 
his own defense . . . . 
Procedural due process often requires confronta-
tion and cross-examination of those whose word 
deprives a person of his livelihood. 
16 Am Jur 2nd Constitutional Law §574 (Footnotes omitted). 
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POINT II 
2. THE OPINION OF JUSTICE HALL IS UNSUPPORTED AND INACCURATE. 
The opinion of Justice Hall found Logan's form of 
government to be patterned upon the federal and state models 
involving separation of powers: 
He [the Mayor] further contends that this is 
because the Act is patterned after the absolute 
separation of powers doctrine set forth in the 
federal and state constitutions. With these 
contentions we agree and reverse the ruling of 
the trial court. 
Hall Opinion at p. 1 [emphasis added]. The opinion's reason-
ing is amply displayed throughout. 
It was from that legislation that the initial 
legislative intent clearly emerged to provide 
an optional form of municipal government framed 
in the image of the federal and state systems. 
Hall Opinion at p. 2 [emphasis added]. 
Helpful to such a determination is a definition 
of executive and legislative powers. Simply 
stated, legislative powers are policy making 
powers, while executive powers are policy 
execution powers. 
Hall Opinion at p. 6. Interpretation of the Act is to be 
based primarily on federal and state models involving separ~ 
tion of powers and "helpful" to that interpretation are 
definitions of "legislative" and "executive" powers. 
Using this basis as the touchstone for interpret~ 
tion, the Hall Opinion then applies its method of interpre-
tation to the issue of whether the mayor [executive branch) 
or the municipal council [legislative branch] has the poweI 
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and authority to buy, sell or exchange real property concluding 
as follows: 
The policy-making powers reserved to the Council 
clearly do not encompass decisions to buy or 
sell property or to otherwise manage it .... 
We consequently hold that the management of 
city property, including its sale and purchase, 
is an executive function reserved to the Mayor. 
Hall Opinion at p. 6 [emphasis added]. 
What is truly clear in Justice Hall's opinion is 
that there was no understanding of federal and state models. 
The Constitution of the United States specifically provides 
in Article IV, Section 3: 
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose 
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the ... property belonging to 
the United States .. 
Respondents have been unable to locate, despite diligent and 
painstaking research, a single, solitary judicial decision or 
legal commentary or treatise which holds other than that 
Congress has the power to control United States' property 
and that the President does not. For everywhere the rule is 
as stated in American Jurisprudence. 
It (the legislature] not only has a legislative 
power over the public domain, but it also 
exercises the powers of the proprietor therein. 
Congress may deal with such lands precisely as 
a private individual may deal with his property, 
and may sell or withhold them from sale. 
63 Am Jur 2d, Public Lands §13 at 488 [footnotes omitted]. 
The rules cannot be more direct and clear: 
Congress has both legislative and proprietary 
powers with respect to the public domain 
it may regulate the use and occupancy of the 
public domain precisely as an individual may 
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deal with and control his land. The power 
over the public domain intrusted to congress 
by the Constitution is exclusive, plenary and 
without limitations. 
73 C.J.S. Public Lands §3 at 649 [footnotes omitted]. 
Congress is vested by the Constitution with the 
power of disposition of public lands. The power 
is without limitation and congress has the 
absolute right to prescribe the times, the 
conditions, and the mode of transferring this 
property or any part of it, and to designate the 
persons by whom, and to whom the transfer shall 
be made. The president has no right to dispose 
of public lands under the Constitution. 
73 C.J.S. Public Lands §24 at 675 [footnotes omitted]. 
See also 73 C.J.S. Public L~nds §§237, 238, 239. 
The opinion fares no better with state constitutio:. 
The Utah Constitution provides 
The Public Institutions of the State are hereby 
permanently located at the places hereinafter 
named each to have the lands specifically 
granted to it by the United States ... to be 
disposed of and used in such manner as the legis-
lature may provide . 
Art. XIX §2 [emphasis added]. 
All lands of the State that have been, or may 
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, 
and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise 
from any person, or that may otherwise be 
acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to 
be the public lands of the State; and shall be 
held in trust for the people, to be disposed of 
as provided by law 
Art. XX §1 [emphasis added]. Clearly under Utah's ConstiW~ 
the legislature controls real property for it can only be 
disposed of "as provided by law" and clearly the governor 
does not make law. Of course, the Congress of the United 
States and the Legislature of the State of Utah have seen fi'. 
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to delegate some portions of this authority to various boards 
and officials. Nevertheless without question the power and 
authority to buy, sell and exchange real property belongs to 
the legislative body in both federal and state models. The 
conclusion concerning real property in the opinion of Justice 
Hall based on its own logic is unsupported and inaccurate. 
The opinion of Justice Hall goes awry in side-
stepping and ignoring the wording, of the statute itself, 
rules of statutory construction and accepted methods of 
interpreting power allocations in separated power, executive-
legislati ve-j udi cial governments. The opinion oversteps all 
this to an assumed and perceived conception of the intent of 
the legislature, a conception which itself is introduced for 
the first time on appeal in an improper and highly prejudicial 
manner. The best indication of the quality of that conception 
is the fact that the very legislator who is represented to 
this Court as having that legislative intent and design is 
now indicating directly to this Court by sworn affidavit that 
his view was misrepresented, that he shares the opposite view 
and that he was not the source of the facts presented therein. 
See Affidavit of the Honorable Willard Hale Gardner, 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
The opinion of Justice Hall sidesteps the following 
accepted rules of statutory construction: 
1. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: When a 
legislature expressly enumerates powers, powers not given are 
considered expressly withheld. The opinion in construing 
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mayoral powers does not follow this rule. Opinion of 
Justice Hall at p. 6. 
2. Noscitur a socis: Words should be inter-
preted in context, i.e., "executive powers" in context would 
be considered those powers expressly given the Mayor in the 
Act. See Section io-3-1219(a) and 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes 
§213 at 407. 
3. Significance to be accorded every word: The 
opinion of Justice Hall ignores Section 10-3-1212 of the Act 
where it says the municipal council is to consider "land 
acquisition." 
4. Words presumed to have same meaning in statutes 
on the same subject: The opinion of Justice Hall finds 
legislative body means one thing in the Act and something 
else [the executive] in zoning and subdivision laws and 
applies a similar methodology to use of "governing body" in 
the Act and elsewhere in the Code. See 73 Am Jur 2d, 
Statutes §233 at 416. 
5. No legislative intent is presumed from 
recodification: The opinion of Mr. Justice Hall states the 
Legislature made an "effort to clarify" and "deleted" 
"governing body" from the Act in an admitted recodification. 
Opinion of Justice Hall at 5. This is contrary to all 
settled rules of construction regarding recodifications. SN 
e.g., 76 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §324 at 472. 
6. No repeal by implication: The opinion of 
Justice Hall finds the Act by implication repeals and reorde: 
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the entire municipal code with respect to power allocation. 
See reasoning at page 7 in the opinion of Justice Hall with 
respect to three separate subdivision laws. This is contrary 
to well settled laws of construction. See 76 Am Jur 2d, 
Statutes §§396, 400, 401 [noting that a repeal by implication 
must be "clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive, 
unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy," 
such that the two acts cannot be reconciled and given effect], 
§402 ["Moreover it has been held that there must be some 
express reference to the previous statute"]. The opinion of 
Justice Hall effects this repeal entirely by its definition 
of "executive" in a general usage and applies that to long-
standing, well established, detailed laws respecting 
subdivision approval. See 76 Am Jur 2d Statutes §181. 
7. Statutes are presumed harmonious and consistent: 
As described, supra, in regard to repeal by implication, the 
opinion of Justice Hall eschews the interpretation that would 
make the Act consistent with other laws respecting municipal 
government. 
8. Acts should be construed as a whole: The opinion 
of Justice Hall rests not to the Act as a whole but on the 
mere general usage of the words executive branch and legis-
lative branch first appearing in a recodification. 
9. A repealed statute replaced by an entirely 
reordered and changed statute is not indicative of legislative 
intent: The Strong Mayor Form of Government is entirely 
dissimilar except in certain general descriptions, it also 
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has express repealers, no enumeration of powers and does 
not call the council "the governing body." See 76 Am Jur 
2d, Statutes §236. Respondents urge first that there is a 
shift evident from one act to the other, i.e., "Strong Mayor 
Form of Government" to "Council-Mayor Form of Government" ar.: 
second, th.at, in any event, the const:ruction placed on the 
strong mayor law is itself erroneous. 
10. Similar legislation in other states is ignored 
The opinion of Justice Hall does not consider nor refer to 
the interpretations in numerous other states which have 
adopted similar legislation. See Respondents Brief at pp. 
19-22. 
11. Confusion should be avoided. Interpretatiom 
which produce uncertainty or insecurity are to be avoidedm 
are distinctions based on "a course of reasoning too 
unsubstantial and ~oo finely drawn for the regulation of 
human action." 76 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §261 at 430, e.g., 
Id., §269 at 436. The opinion of Justice Hall would have 
Logan remake the entire municipal code on whether a 
particular function is "executive" or "legislative." Mister 
are likely to be frequent and litigation is the only final 
recourse for determinations. 
The dangers of disregarding the cannons of 
statutory construction and basing a decision on unsworn 
allegations of individual legislators are manifest, First, 
as the treatises express it 
statutes are considered to have been enacted 
with a view to their interpretation according 
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to the settled maxims and principles 
of statutory construction. 
76 Am Jur 2d Statutes §142 at 349. The legislature cannot 
enact its will if the court presumes its enactments are not 
according to the cannons of interpretation. Second, there 
is a high probability for error in making such conjectures 
aliunde. Error that is actual and palpable herein not merely 
possible. 
The opinion itself is not true to its own conclu-
sions. That is its method of interpreting the allocation 
of powers in a legislative-executive-judicial, separated 
powers government is not consistent with the method of 
interpretation used in federal and state models: 
In considering the nature of any government, 
it must be remembered that the power existing 
in every body politic is an absolute depotism; 
in constituting a government, the body politic 
distributes that power as it pleases and in 
the quantity it pleases, and imposes what checks 
it pleases upon its public functionaries. The 
natural and necessary distribution of that 
power, with respect to individual security, is 
into legislative, executive, and judicial 
departments. It is obvious, however, that every 
community may make a perfect or imperfect 
separation and distribution of that power at 
its will. 
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional law §210 [footnotes omitted]. 
That is, that the separation of powers concept does not say 
which powers are to be separated to each body but merely that 
they are to be separated. 
The courts have perceived the necessity of 
avoiding a narrow construction of a state 
constitutional provision for the division of 
the powers of government into three distinct 
departments, for it is impractical to vi~w ~he 
provision from the standpoint of a doctrinaire. 
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16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §214. Indeed Respondents 
contend that is exactly what the opinion of Justice Hall does. 
it devises "doctrinaire" definitions of "executive" and 
"legislative" and then demands the entire remaking of the 
Municipal Code on that basis. 
Indeed, the rules of interpretation with respect ~ 
allocations of power in the federal and state models are not 
followed or even alluded to in the opinion of Justice Hall: 
In accordance with the doctrine that the state 
constitution is not a grant of power, but only a 
limitation, as far as the legislature is concerned, 
it is a recognized principle of cons ti tutiorial law. 
that except where limitations have been imposed by 
the federal or state constitution, or by the valid 
treaties and acts of Congress, the power of a 
state legislature is unlimited and practically 
absolute; it extends to any subject within the 
scope of civil government, .... a state 
legislature does not act under enumerated or grant' 
powers, but rather under inherent powers, restrl~ 
only by the provisions of the constitution. If 
limitations upon the exercise of the lawmaking , 
function are not found in the cons ti tut ion, they de 
not exist, except insofar as all cons ti tut ions may I 
be said to be limited. As a rule, therefore, and 
speaking generally, a legislature may do what the I 
state and federal constitutions do not prohibit. 
So long as no constitutional limits are exceeded, 
the legislative will is supreme and must be obe~ed 
by all other departments of the government. 
The powers of the other two departments are not~ 
extensive. The reason is that, unlike the lawmak1;. 
power, the power of the executive and judicial 
dpeartments in a state government is a grant, nQU. 
limitation, and those two coordinate departments o:, 
government can therefore exercise only the poweM 
conferred upon them by the constitution .. 
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §228 [footnotes omitted, 
emphasis added]. 
It has been said that the executive power is mo" 
limited than legislative powers, extending merelY 
to the details of carrying into effect laws 
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enacted by the legislature as they may be inter-
preted by the courts, the legislature having the 
power, except where limited by the constitution 
itself, to stipulate what actions executive 
officers shall or shall not perform. 
76 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §216 [footnotes omitted, emphasis 
added]. These principles are too well known and followed to 
be subject to any question. See cases cited in 16 Am Jur 2d, 
Constitution Law §228. Corpus Juris Secundum summarizes the 
rules succinctly: 
[T]he legislative department has all power not 
expressly denied to it or given to another 
branch of the government, and that wherever 
the legislative power of a government is un-
defined it includes the judicial and executive 
attributes, and that so great is the scope and 
extent of this authority that, in the absence 
of constitutional restrictions, the department 
wielding it might with comparative ease absorb 
within itself all the functions of the state. 
It is the predominant branch of the government, 
and in the absence of express limitations, the 
extent of its power cannot be definitely stated. 
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law §106 at 296~ [emphasis added]. 
The application of these rules of interpretation 
based on federal and state models is that the municipal 
council (legislative body) has all those powers and duties not 
given the Mayor (executive branch). Further that these powers 
are separate and neither entity can interfere with the other's 
exercise of power given or remaining in its sphere. The opinion 
of Justice Hall is methodologically opposite, it determines 
that the "executive" shall by mere use of that word be deemed 
to have any and all functions meeting the opinion's own skewed 
definition of "executive." As a result of this cankered 
method all power allocations existing in municipal government 
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are to be nullified and reconstructed. The opinion is not tri: 
to its own method--if it wishes to slavishly apply federal 
and state models then let them be applied well. 
Any idea that the Congress of the United States ~ 
the Legislature of the State of Utah has merely "pure 
legislative ~owers" is palpably erroneous. This is most 
clearly elucidated in decisions and discussions of delegabilit 
where the distinction is critical: 
The general doctrine as to the inalienability of 
the lawmaking function applies to the federal 
government. Congress cannot delegate to any 
other body its strictly legislative powers. 
As has already been indicated, the rule of 
nondelegability is applicable to legislative 
powers only; the rule does not bar Congress or 
other legislatures from delegating such of 
their powers as are not legislative in nature. 
Thus,the rule is that in order that a court may 
be justified in holding a statute unconstitional 
as a delegation of legislative power, it must 
appear that the power involved is purely legis-
lative in nature--that is, one appertaining 
exclusively to the legislative department. 
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§241, 242. [footnotes 
omitted]. Given the wide range of delegation, the numerous 
powers of a legislative body which are not "legislative in 
nature" is evident. For example, the Utah State Legislature 
has delegated its powers to buy, sell and exchange real pro~M 
to a State Land Board, executive officers, etc. What is 
happening is that a power not legislative in nature but 
confided to the legislative body is being delegated pursuant ' 
to state law. Of course, from time to time the Utah State 
legislature may itself sell property on its authority, it 
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having the entire authority to do so. For example, in 
1957 the State legislature directed the sale of legally 
described lands to the Ute Indian Tribe reserving to itself 
the minerals for the consideration of $2.50 an acre. See 
Section 65-18-83 U.C.A. 1953. 
The weaknesses inherent in the opinion of Justice 
Hall are well illustrated in its ruling on subdivisions: 
When viewed in the light of the foregoing 
concepts, [referring to definition of "executive" 
and "legislative] the approval of subdivisions 
in accordance with rules, policies, and proce-
dures adopted by the legislative branch of 
municipal government clearly appears to be a 
function of the executive branch .... 
In treating this issue, the trial judge, although 
erroneously, had already determined that the 
Council was generally vested with executive cowers 
as would permit it to accrove subdivisions. 
Consequently, he unnecessarily concerned himself 
with the delegability of that power. 
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, 
the Council has no executive cowers to delegate and 
it only exercised its legislative powers in adopt-
ing the ordinances which established the policies 
to be executed by the Mayor in reviewing and 
approving subdivisions. In reaching this conclu-
sion we are not unmindful of three separate 
statutory provisions, separate from the Act, which 
bear upon the approval and subsequent recordation 
of subdivision plats in the office of the county 
recorder. One such provision provides for approval 
by the planning commission and "legislative body" 
and renders void any subdivision plat recorded in 
the office of the county recorder which has not 
been so approved; and another provides for approval 
by the "legislative authority"; and the third 
provides for approval "by its governing body, or by 
some city or town officer for that purpose designated 
by resolution or ordinance.'' 
The inconsistencies in the terminology of the 
statutes in referring to the approving authority 
is of some concern, but is by no means overpower-
ing for the following reasons. The obvious purpose 
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of each of the statutes is to insure appropriate 
approval of plats in order to preserve their 
sanctity when recorded. This is n0cessary to 
protect those who acquire property within 
the plats, since a properly recorded plat is 
a prerequisite to valid title. It is also 
obvious that the statutes do not undertake to 
vest any authority to approve plats but only to 
recognize existing authority to approve and 
require it to act. Hence their use of the 
terms "legislative body," "legislative authority," 
and "governing body" must be deemed to have been 
in their c;eneric sense only and not an attempt to 
designate the functions of any particular govern-
ing body. 
It is also to be observed that the statutes are 
of long duration, having been enacted before 
strong-mayor and council-mayor forms of govern-
ment were provided for, and when only traditional 
forms of government were available. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that they contemplate only 
a single governing body exercising both legislative 
and executive powers. It is interesting to 
note, however, that even so, the statute that 
appears in the "Plats and Subdivisions" chapter 
of the Code recognizes that the governing body 
may designate, by resolution or ordinance, a city 
or town officer as the approving authority. 
We conclude that the Mayor's approval of sub-
division plats is an appropriate executive power 
and that such is in compliance with statutory 
requirements and prerequisites for the recording 
thereof. 
Opinion of Justice Hall at p. 7-8 [emphasis added]. 
The task imposed upon a city by this method of 
interpretation should be clarified. The entire Chapter 9 of 
Title 10 governing zoning powers and sub di vision approvals 
uses the term "legislative body." In the opinion of Justice 
Hall the use of that term "legislative body" in Section 
10-9-25 should be read in cities adopting the Optional Forms 
Act as "the mayor" because that function in that statute 
appears to be not purely "legislative." So each usage of thr 
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term "legislative body" in Chapter 9 must now be scrutinized 
to see whether it means "the mayor" or truly the "legislative 
body." 
For example, Section 10-9-23 which provides: 
From and after the time when the planning 
commission of any municipality shall have 
adopted a major street plan, the legislative 
body may establish an official map of the 
whole or any part or parts of the municipality 
theretofore existing and established by law as 
public streets. Such official map may also 
show the location of the lines of streets on 
plats of subdivisions which shall have been 
approved by the planning commission. The 
legislative body may make, from time to time, 
other additions to or modifications of the 
official map by placing thereon the lines of 
proposed new streets or street extensions, 
widenings, narrowings, or vacations which have 
been accurately surveyed and definitely located; 
provided, however, that before taking any such 
action the legislative body shall hold a 
public hearing thereon and provided, further, 
that such proposed addition to or modification 
of the official map shall be submitted to the 
planning commission for its approval, and in 
the event of such commission's disapproval, 
such addition or modification shall require the 
favorable vote of not less than a majority of 
the entire membership of the legislative 
body ..... 
If the "legislative body" term in Section 10-9-23 is inter-
preted to be legislative body and not mayor then it is that 
body which establishes the "official map" and determines any 
changes to the map by "new streets" "additions," "extensions," 
"widenings," "narrowings," etc. Under the opinion of Justice 
Hall the mayor would not have this authority, since the 
adoption of a street plan is presumably an ordinance and 
thus, "purely legislative." But if the "legislative body" 
does control adoption and changes in.the official map pursuant 
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to Section 10-9-23 how can the mayor be considered the 
repository of the authority to approve subdivisions which 
inherently is the right to approve and accept new streets 
into the city street plan? 
Interestingly the application of the opinion of 
Justice Hall leads to another curious result in application to 
Section 10-9-25. The statute has two uses of the term 
legislative body. The opinion finds the second usage to be 
"the mayor." The first usage refers to certifying the offic~ 
map to the "legislative body." Thus the opinion of Justice 
Hall tends to the anomalous couclusion that within Section 
10-9-25 the first use of "legislative body" means legislative 
body and the second use of "legislative body" means the mayor. 1 
And why, because there is language in the Optional Forms Act 
loosely referring to an executive branch, a legislative brM~ 1 
and separation of powers. 
The application of the opinion of Justice Hall to 
subdivision and zoning laws reveals it to be contrary to: 
numerous cannons of statutory construction. [Rules of 
construction are indicated by numerical reference to paragraph: 
at pp. of this brief.] 
1. It gives the mayor a power not enumerated 
contrary to Rule #1. 
2. It interprets "executive" out of context then 
applies the definition out of context to Chapter 9 term 
"legislative body" contrary to Rule #2. 
3. It interprets words "legislative body" in t~ 
same statute to have different meanings contrary to Rule #3· ' 
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4. It repeals and/or amends the entire use of 
"legislative body" in Chapter 9 by the implications of the 
imposed definition of "executive" contrary to Rule #6. 
5. It disregards the Rule #7 that statutes are 
to be harmonized. 
6. It engenders great confusion and uncertainty 
contrary to Rule #11. 
7. It draws distinctions "too unsubstantial and 
too finely drawn to regulate human action," i.e., regulate 
zoning, contrary to Rule #11. 
The court's disregard for these rules in relation 
to subdivision approval is a presumption that the state 
legislature did not know the maxims of construction or and 
that the legislature did not know that the entire zoning and 
subdivision were built on a power allocation to the 
"legislative body.n 
Further, the application of the accepted interpreta-
tions of federal and state power allocations reveals the 
erroneous conclusions reached in the opinion of Justice Hall. 
Those accepted interpretations wholly ignored with respect to 
its discussion of subdivision approval are as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
The legislative body has all powers not 
granted to executive or judicial departments. 
Separation of powers is to be determined by 
each body politic, there is no requirement 
that certain powers be allocated to 
certain branches. 
Divisions of power in separation of power 
governments are not to be doctrinaire; 
that is, they are to be divided by 
allocation not definition. 
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4. The legislative body may stipulate, 
except where limited, as to what the 
executive may or may not do. 
Interestingly the opinion of Justice Hall indicates 
its ruling is not as to delegability, but shear executive 
power. That is, the municipal council has no power to 
delegate and thus cannot even set controls on the use of that 
power. That is, the Mayor cannot be regulated for it is, in 
the opinion of Justice Hall, an executive power; "We need not 
concern ourselves and the trial judge "unnecessarily concern~ 
himself with the delegability of that power." Opinion of 
Justice Hall at p. 7. 
The application of the opinion of Justice Hall to 
subdivision approval reveals its flaws; flaws which pervade 
the entire opinion and all its holdings. It is neither 
consistent with its own chosen models nor with accepted rules 
of statutory construction. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors complained of if allowed to stand will 
erect a monument of confusion to the rule of law, due process, 
and will cause perpetual conflict in any municipality operatini 
under the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. The 
opinion of Justice Crockett should be adopted by the Court. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Dfil:NES & DAINES 
\ ' 
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Ilot:SE OF HEPHESENTATIVES 
STATE 0 F UTAH 
TIEI'. \\-ILL.1111l lT.\l.E (;.\J:ll'\1-:J:. 38TH DISTRICT 
1495 OAK LANE PROVO. UTAH 84601 
COMMITTEES APPROPRIATIONS (GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CHAIRMAN I 
REVENUE ANO TAXATION LOCAL. STATE Ii FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 
STATE OF UTAH) 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
SS 
~.:,~, .. :W&.;.:.~,~r1·£1·r Fllllllj '11tl1•c.1J1 '"" 11111111 '"··~· "''''-'''.!''·-"""' 1;:;---~ffe~~:.. 
I, WILLARD HALE GARDNER, BEING DULY SWORN ON OATH DO 
DEPOSE AND SAY1 
1. 'Ihat I am a member of the Utah House of Representatives 
and have been since before 1974. Further that I was actively involved 
in the paesage of Senate Bill #179 in the 1975 Session, known as the 
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. 
2. 'Ihat my name appeared as Amicus Curiae in Supreme Court 
No, 15498, Martindale v. Anderson. Until July 28th, 1978, I was not 
aware that my name was specifically being used but I do recall some 
discussion concerning the case some time ago, 'lhe Brief of Amicus 
Cuariae does not acurately represent my views concerning this municipal 
form of government, I never recall being asked for my views nor was 
I consulted concerning the contents of the Brief filed. 
J. 'Ihat to my knowledge the sponsor of this legislation 
never specifically discussed the intent of the legislation with specific 
regard to real property transactions or approval of subdivisions with 
regard to whether power was to be lodged with the municipal council or 
mayor. However the view that these powers are lodged solely with 
the mayor appears contrary to every deliberation and consideration to 
which I was privy during the preparation and passage of this legislation. 
4. With regard specifically to the purchase, sale and 
exchange of real property my intent was and I believe the intent of 
the legislature was that the municipal council have the authority and 
poser of control. 'Ihe fulfillment of the plans and actual acts in 
carrying out those powers could, of course, be delegated, It is contrary 
to any intent that I ever had that a mayor acting on his own authority 
could sell parks, or any other municipal real property without authority 
of the municipal council. 
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5. 'Ihat with regard to subdivision approval again it is 
contrary to any legislative intent that I ever had or which I believe 
the legislature ever had that the mayor possessed unilateral power 
to appro;e or disapprove subdivisions. 'Ihis ~ain is such a significant 
and important decision in a municipality that it should not be left 
to one man's determination but that such decisions should be made by 
the legislative body elected by the people. As to whether this 
power is delegable or as to the appropriate procedure for delgation 
I have no firm opinion. 
6. With regard to the Act generally, it is my opinion that 
all municipal statutes not modified directly by the Act would remain 
applicable. 'Ihat is that for example in the powers given cities to 
regulate by zoning those references to "legislative body" would be 
to the municipal counail except where the Optional Forms Act 
specifically changes that power allocation. I do not believe that 
the legislature intended to cause a city to embark on the task of 
reducing every power given to cities into tight categories of 
legislative and executive qualities and thereby remak~n the muncipal 
code, 
Residing at 1 ;l. ,,..,,. ;f/,;t~ 
Commission expires 1 01 .piz; 
WILLARD HALE GARDNER 
1Notary Public -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-"B" 
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF UTAH 
LOYE E. MARTINDALE; DARWIN W. 
LARSEN; CAROL W. CLAY; LOGAH 
CITY, a municipal corporation; 
and the MUNICIPAL COUNCIL of 
Logan City, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents 
vs. 
Mayor DESMOND L. ANDERSON; 
City Attorney J. BLAINE 
ZOLLINGER; City Auditor and 
Budge Officer DUANE H. BECK. 
Defendants, Appellants 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of Cache ) 
AFFIDAVIT ON 
PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
COMES NOW CHARLES BULLEN and being first duly sworn 
on oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am at the present time a duly elected and 
serving member of the Utah State Senate; and, 
2. That during the 1975 Session of the Utah Legislature, 
I was a member of the Utah House of Representatives representing 
Legislature District No. 58 which includes most of Logan City. 
Since that time, I have continued in being elected State Senator 
in District No. 25 in 1976. 
3. That since becoming a member of the Utah Legis-
lature, I have been familiar with the legislative action relative 
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to so called "Optional Forms of Municipal Government" primarily 
because of political initiatives with respect to such legislation 
from groups and individuals promoting changes for the specific 
benefit of Logan City; and, 
4. That I know that the Strong-Mayor Form of Optional 
Municipal Government Act was in force and available to Logan City 
if approved by the electorate between 1959 and 1975, and that 
pursuant to said act a proposal of adoption was presented to 
the voters of Logan City in referendum form in 1973 and the 
majority of voters of Logan City rejected the Strong-Mayor 
Optional Form of Municipal Government; and, 
5. That the Strong-Mayor Optional Form of Government 
act was repealed by the legislature in its 1975 Session, that 
I know that one of the primary political forces that implored 
the legislature to repeal the act was the negative results of 
the 1~73 referendum in Logan City reflecting substantial, 
substantive objection of the Logan electorate to the Strong-Mayor 
Optional Form of Government; and, 
6. That during the 1975 legislative session, various 
proposals of Optional Forms of Municipal Government were 
proposed including one HB 215 which I sponsored but later with-
drew in favor of SB 179 sponsored by State Senator Karl Snow 
and others, which became law. In my opinion, all of the optional 
forms presented intentionally did not contain the words "Strong-
Mayor. Such title and substance changes from the Strong-Mayor 
Act were consciously designed to construct one or more Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government available to all cities but which 
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corrected the preceived substantive objections of the Logan 
electorate to the Strong-Mayor Form. Thereafter, the same Logan 
body electorate which had rejected the Strong-Mayor Form adopted 
the Council-Mayor Form; and, 
7. That from my exposure of the legislative process 
it was my distinct understanding that the Mayor under SB 179 
had the exclusive authority to deal administratively with Depart-
ment Heads and city employees, but that the Mayor could only 
buy, sell or trade real property upon authorization and/or 
{t~ direct~~ of the Council. I also understood that matters such 
as location of roads and streets as inherently involved in sub-
division approvals and adoptive major road plans and long term 
commitment of city services to new development were also within 
the powers given to the council; and, 
8. It was my understanding of SB 179 that it did 
propose to separate powers between the council and the Mayor. 
That in separating the powers it was a distinct intentional 
departure from the previous Commission-Mayor Form of Government. 
I understood that the act provided generally for such division 
on policy making or legislation and administrative or executive 
lines as between the Council and Mayor respectively. I under-
stood that these general terms were given express and specific 
meaning by the act itself, which defined, quite apart from those 
general designations, in terms directly applicable to muncipal 
government under Utah law, which body had which powers. 
9. That as a member of the House Sifting Committee, 
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1975 Session, in representing the desires of Logan City for 
an Optional Form of Government, I was instrumental in referring 
Senate Bill 179 to the House floor and causing its passage. 
9. I understand that this affidavit is given for the 
purpose of evidencing general and specific legislative intent 
with respect to the subject legislation on a petition for 
rehearing before the Utah Supreme Court and that if I am given 
the opportunity, I will testify and be subject to cross-examina-
tion on the statements contained in this affidavit and hereby 
waive any priviledge that may be granted to me to refrain from 
testifying concerning the above or related matters. 
SIGNED this '3 \ ~): day of July, 197 8. 
CHARLES BULLEN 
3/s_r day SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ~-
of July, 1978. 
Residing at: L8fj1411tk&. Commission exoires:1;/16/7C1 • I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, prepaid, two copies 
of the following Brief of Petitioners, to the following: 
Melvin E. Leslie, Esq. 
Steven W. Allred, Esq. 
403 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
J. Blaine Zollinger 
Logan City Attorney 
61 West 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
Calvin L. Rampton, Esq. 
Suzanne Dallimore, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
McDONOUGH 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Councilman Claude J. Burtenshaw 
61 West 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
this ~day of August, 1978. 
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